Democratic theory assumes that successful democratic representation will create close ideological congruence between citizens and their governments. The success of different types of election rules in creating such congruence is an ongoing target of political science research. As often in political science, a widely demonstrated empirical finding, the greater congruence associated with PR election rules, has ceased to hold. I suggest that systematically taking account in our theories of conditional effects of local context can often provide a remedy. The systematic incorporation of levels of political party
A more specific form of this very large question has juxtaposed two of the most common forms of election rules--Single Member District "majoritarian" rules and Proportional Representation rules. These investigations have clarified many aspects of the consequences of election rules and opened the way to understanding many more. One of those consequences has been the fit between the ideological preferences of the citizens and the ideological commitments of their governments. Democratic theory assumes that successful democracy will create close ideological congruence. Until recently a relatively clear-cut consensus had emerged as to which type of election rules generated closer ideological congruence. But, as is not unusual in the world of politics, the clearly emergent pattern has become less clear, forcing a reconsideration of underlying theory.
The emergence of a more encompassing theory, one that takes account of critical contextual conditions in making revised explanations and predictions, is the basis of my Address today.
I. When Theories Fail: On the Importance of Local Context in Applying General
Theories.
A common frustration in political science research arises when our general theories or broad generalizations turn out to disappear over time or fail when we attempt to apply them in another country or even region. We have a broad pattern of association, reliably observed and grounded, maybe even supported by a field experiment, plausibly explained with reasonably general theories, seemingly applicable to a variety of situations. Then, it seems to fade away over time or doesn't work as we move across nations, or even regions within a nation. This is disconcerting for a variety of reasons. It undermines our confidence in our observations, in our theories, even our type of explanation. Moreover, it limits our ability to perform in that rare, but exciting, opportunity to give advice to policy makers, as have many political scientists in dealing with the elites designing new legislative bodies after the Arab spring.
Of course, this is frustrating. And it leads some of us to despair of developing general theories in political science. But I want to offer a take on this problem that is more optimistic than referring to the inherent unpredictability of human affairs or the commitment to purely local and temporary explanations.
My "take" is that we can get a lot of leverage on this problem by looking for aspects of the local context that shape the working of our theories. A good reason for building our generalizations and explanations on well-grounded theory is because the theory itself directs our attention to features of the context that change the working of relationships. which advantaged locally larger parties and underrepresented smaller ones that failed to carry individual districts, and a "psychological effect," which pointed to strategic behavior of voters in defecting from parties whom they liked but whom were expected to be unable to win. 6 The interaction of these two effects leads to expectations about the number of competing parties (at the district level at least 13 With the aid of some heroic assumptions, the party choices of voters can be used to estimate the citizen median on that same left-right scale. The wonderful Comparative Study of Electoral Systems project has made these ratings available across many countries in elections of the last 15 years.
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Each of these approaches (and some others) has various comparative advantages and disadvantages-and its strong advocates and critics. In my own work I've avoided taking a strong position on this, (easy for me as most of my earlier work used yet a different approach comparing expert placement of parties to citizen self-placements, 16 ) but rather have tried to explain ideological congruence and generate similar results using each approach. Table 1 shows some ideological congruence results from some countries covered by the CSES Module 2 research program. These are expressed as distance on a ten point scale. The number is the distance between the median voter and the government; the larger the number, the less ideological congruence. As the median voter usually places himself or herself towards the center, the maximum possible value is usually around 5. In these countries they range from a miniscule .07 in Canada and .10 in Taiwan; the citizens on average place the parties in the government at nearly the same position as they place themselves. In Australia, Denmark, Iceland, Portugal and Japan, on the other hand they place the government parties around two full scale points away, and in Hungary and 18 and further articulated by various scholars since. 19 ) They are based on two of the most widely discussed theories in comparative politics, Duverger's Law, associating the election rules and the number of political parties, 20 and Anthony Downs's theory of party convergence in two party systems 21 and non-convergence in multiparty systems. Electoral Systems program, which began in the late 1990s, as in Table 1 ,) which found no significant difference between ideological congruence in SMD and PR electoral systems. 25 Their work was soon replicated, and though initial suspicion fell on the different measurement methods, it became pretty apparent that there had been a distinct change in the level of ideological congruence in the SMD systems after the mid-1990s.
III. Context of Representation: Party System Polarization.
You'll not be surprised, given my framing of this talk, that I have a candidate for a variable feature of the political context that can account for this change in the consequences of election laws after, roughly, the mid-1990s. What I am looking for is a variable that fits into our theoretical understanding of the causal mechanisms connecting election laws and ideological congruence, that operates the same way itself in a variety of places and times, that shapes the local context in a way that conditions the election law mechanisms, and whose changing values account for these over time changes.
My candidate is a variable that we already know affects various aspects of voter and elite behavior, such as the degree to which voters take account of ideological differences between parties 27 and the stability of parliamentary coalition governments: 28 the ideological polarization of the party system.
By ideological polarization I mean the degree to which the parties are spread across the political spectrum (whatever the content of that spectrum in a given country.) In a low polarization party system the parties, or at least the larger parties, are grouped towards the political center. In a system with greater polarization, the parties are spread apart. This is conveniently measured by the variance of the parties' ideological positions, weighted by the size of the parties.
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Theoretical expectations.
We would expect that higher levels of party system polarization would make close ideological congruence more difficult; lower levels of party system polarization would make close ideological congruence easier. And that this operates as a contextual or conditioning effect on the election law consequences. At low levels of polarization any set of election rules will generate good ideological congruence. At high levels of polarization, any set of election rules will have difficulty, but the effects should be especially sharp under SMD rules.
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE
We can see why we expect these effects with a revised version of Figure 1 , showing how polarization levels condition the working of the causal mechanisms of SMD and PR.
At the top of Figure 2 we see the causal mechanisms of SMD, as before. Polarization of the party system sharply affects the propensity of party elites to converge; in low polarization conditions convergence is encouraged; in high polarization conditions, they resist convergence. With high polarization Downsian expectations will be confounded, even for a two party configuration. (If this sounds vaguely familiar to you students of current American politics watching the presidential election process….. well, you are the American politics experts, I'm just a comparativist.) In an SMD parliamentary system, this high polarization will produce a majority party in the legislature that forms a government far from the median voter. In a PR parliamentary system, the familiar workings of PR will reproduce the party system polarization faithfully in the legislature, where the process of government formation will tend, less systematically, to create governments whose parties are further from the median voter than in low polarization conditions. But the presence of the median legislative party in the coalitions should still help mitigate polarization consequences somewhat.
In Figure 3 we can see how this played out in Britain in two pairs of high and low polarization periods in an SMD system: 1950 and 1959 and 1983 and 2001. substantially. Which ever large party wins, it will be close to the median voter.
These two sets of figures show how powerful is the resistance of party polarization against ideological congruence with a majoritarian party system. If we take a closer look at 1983 we can also see how even with this degree of party system polarization, a PR electoral system would have been helpful. Assuming-admittedly, a dubious assumption, but interesting for illustrative purposes-that the parties and voters would have been the same, but with PR election rules, neither large party would have won a majority (Mrs.
Thatcher's Conservatives were the larger party with about 42% of the vote.) To form a majority government would have required some kind of coalition, probably with the Liberal Democrats, who were fairly close to the median voter; that coalition would have created a much more-though not entirely-centrist government, with greater ideological congruence.
Conditional Relationships.
Of course, favorite examples are all very well, but how general are these effects, and do they really account for the changing levels of ideological congruence in the SMD systems? The answer, I was somewhat surprised to find, is surprisingly general and surprisingly well. (Though, of course, in all honesty, we only have a limited number of SMD systems, which limits our confidence a bit.) Table 2 shows some conditional regression results of equations with an interactive term for polarization. To reassure us that the results are not a consequence of the special measurement procedures, column 1 is based on the manifesto data and includes 327 cases from the end of WWII to 2003 in the developed democracies. Column 2 is based on the CSES data mentioned above, and just the similar "developed" or "old" democracies; using Modules 1, 2, and 3 now available it includes 52 elections. In both data sets the congruence measures are transformed into 10 point scales for comparability. (As in Table   1 above). And it works in the 82 total elections combining old and new democracies. (We could also say a word about presidentialism here-polarization is also significantly negative in presidential systems although slightly less strongly. 32 ) (By the way, the negative coefficient for the election laws dummy shows that if polarization is minimal, SMD rules have slightly better congruence, although the difference is not significant.)
We also can use the manifesto data to examine the aggregate patterns of ideological congruence over time in the SMD systems and see whether changing polarization levels explain some or all of those differences. However, the second column introduces two features of the party system, the effective number of voted parties 34 and the polarization of the party system. In this column only the polarization variable is statistically significant in explaining distance between government and median voter, on which it has a powerful enhancing effect.
Notable, for our purposes, is that none of the variables for the decade dummies are now significant. The changing levels of party system polarization explain them away. The models in the subsequent column show that as our causal mechanism analysis expects, the polarization effect itself operates through the distances of the plurality party and the legislative median party (highly correlated in these systems, but not perfectly due to pre-election coalitions in SMD, but not plurality, systems of Australia and France.) Decade effects remain insignificant as long as polarization is in the equation.
Another way of describing this effect is that in the most recent decade the average polarization in the PR systems drops slightly (1.8 to 1.6), but the average polarization in the SMD systems drops very sharply (1.6 to 1.1.) Because polarization has so much bigger impact on ideological congruence in SMD systems, the similar earlier levels create higher average incongruence in SMD. Now that (as Downs would have expected)
polarization is much less in SMD, the two congruence outcomes are roughly equivalent.
Exploring the causal mechanisms. Tables 4 and Table 5 show the differing roles of plurality and median parties in the two types of systems. We see that in the 229 PR cases in Table 4 the distances of a variety of parties (including the previous governing parties and Pre-election coalitions and even the 2 nd largest party) play a role in government formation and in the polarization effect. In the first column we see the effect of polarization in voter-government distance in these 229 PR elections. In the subsequent columns we gradually add the distances of parties that theoretically we expect to be involved in government formation: the largest party, then also the median party, then also the previous governing parties. Then we replace the largest single party with any pre-election coalition that is bigger than the largest party.
Finally, we take account of even the second largest party. Note that as we add the distances of these different parties that in various countries are involved in government formation, the polarization coefficient gradually declines. Polarization is working through the distances of this variety of parties, as we expect from the literature on government formation in parliamentary systems without a single-party majority.
TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE
In the 79 SMD elections in Table 5 the process is different. The polarization coefficient is initially much larger (as we expect from Table 2 .) But as soon as we add the distance of the plurality vote winner the polarization coefficient is reduced to insignificance. We can explain somewhat more of the variance by taking account of the median party separately, where these are different, and especially by taking account of any plurality Pre-Election coalitions (common in Australia and France.) But none of the other parties are needed to account for the effect of polarization.
TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE
The main point that I would have you take away from these two tables is that polarization is a problem for ideological congruence in both PR and SMD systems, especially in SMD systems (larger coefficient initially), but that the causal mechanisms are somewhat different. They both have to do with government formation in these parliamentary systems, which operate under roughly the same formal rules, but in the PR cases it's a complex, multiparty government formation process, whereas in the SMD systems it's usually about the direct election of a legislative majority party or pre-election coalition. This exploration of the connections linking the election and the government outcome fits nicely with our expectations from theories of government formation in parliamentary systems and helps us better understand the process.
IV. Context as a Step towards Explanation.
Let us suppose, which I don't insist, that you accept that adding consideration of party system polarization as a conditioning (interactive) feature of the local political context makes it possible to explain (statistically and with respect to causal mechanisms) and predict the consequences of election laws for ideological congruence more satisfactorily (at least in parliamentary systems.)
Where does that leave us in the larger question of generally taking account of local context in theories in political science? I want to leave you with several thoughts about that issue.
First, is that, of course, identifying an important contextual factor and incorporating it into our theories as a conditioning variable doesn't end our search for adequate explanation. We still want to know what accounts for party system polarization, or adequate citizen information about relative strength of parties, or whatever. As usual in science, to answer one research question is to generate others. I've been doing some work on cross-national sources of party system polarization, looking at things like citizen ideological polarization, socio-economic conditions, international ideological trends, and so forth. 36 I've found some glimmers, but none of these really account for what happened in Britain between mid 1980s and late 1990s, which seems deeply bound up in relations between activists and leaders within the political parties. This is both frustrating and fascinating, and, in my view, that's inevitable as the process of science pushes both deeper and broader into the search for explanation.
A second perspective goes in a slightly different direction and asks whether we can develop more general theories about context and election rules (and by extension, context and other generalizations and theories). At the moment we have an APSA Presidential Task Force looking into what political science knows about a variety of different consequences of adopting different election laws, and one group is looking at the effects of local context. 37 We've identified a couple of tantalizing ideas trying to get at this more generally. This is really in its infancy, but it seems so interesting that I can't resist trying to share it a bit.
Two points have emerged so far. One is that it may be constructive-or instructive--to build on Duverger's old idea of "mechanical" and strategic effects of election laws. 38 A second point is that some of the consequences of election laws are quite proximate to the election itself, while others, such as the consequences of election laws for minority representation or collective accountability or stable government, are more distant, (in time, logical sequence or both,) involving more causal linkages. In the case of these more distant consequences, there are more opportunities for contextual effects to shape the various causal linkages, hence the need to take more contextual conditions into account in theory and explanation.
Thus, the more causal linkages there are between the election rules and the consequences of interest to us, and the more of these linkages involve strategic processes, the more essential it is to take account of local conditions. This is just a preliminary reading of the evidence and not well-grounded theory or observation. But there seem to be exciting possibilities in the development of theories of contextual effects, and, even more broadly, for political science theories that give us more consistent and general explanations.
V. Concluding Remarks.
One of the exciting features of political science is its interaction with great normative issues, such as representation and democracy. I have always found that converting these issues into substantive research puzzles that can be studied objectively has been one of the fascinating challenges of political science research. In the past two decades I've been wrestling with the puzzle of election rules and ideological congruence, trying to understand the theoretical basis of the electoral connection between citizens and policymakers. This seems a puzzle at the heart of representative democracy.
The changing nature of the empirical relationship between election rules and ideological congruence poses a challenge to our ability to cope with the ever-changing world of politics. This is a familiar challenge for political science. Our theories are always being pushed by the need to respond to new, diverse conditions. Founding our generalizations on basic theories of mechanisms and processes makes it possible to rebuild them in ways that take account of critical features of local context, such as party system polarization. Taking theoretically based account of local context, in turn, enhances our understanding of where and when we expect the generalizations to hold.
Political science need not abandon its effort to find systematic answers to our empirical questions; nor must it ignore the normative concerns that gave rise to those questions. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- *= significant at .05 **=significant at .01 Notes: the 100 point manifesto data scale has been translated into a ten point scale for comparison to CSES, and the "Dalton" version of the polarization measure is used in each. CSES includes Modules 1, 2, and 3. The "old democracies" in CSES are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, US. "New" democracies in CSES are Bulgaria, Chile, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Korea, Mexico, Peru, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovenia, and Taiwan. SMD are Australia, Canada, Great Britain, France, US ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

36
